CVE-2026-17106
NVD analysis in progress
The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory. The extractor decides where each archive entry lands using lexical string checks and then performs the filesystem operation on a path that is resolved by the OS, so links introduced by the archive can be followed out of the destination directory. An attacker who controls the contents of an archive can create or overwrite files at arbitrary paths writable by the extracting process.
What this means
- Exposure
- Exploitable with local access to the machine and without authentication — but only if a user opens booby-trapped content. It also depends on circumstances the attacker does not control.
- Impact
- An attacker can read sensitive data, modify or destroy data and take the service offline.
- Weakness
- The program follows a symbolic link without checking its target, so a local attacker can redirect it to a sensitive file.
- Likelihood
- Its EPSS score stays low: nothing points to imminent exploitation, which is no reason to leave it unpatched.
What to doFold into the next patch cycle.
Read automatically from the CVSS vector, the weakness type (CWE) and the EPSS score. The technical description above remains the one published by NIST.