CVE-2026-47724
NVD analysis in progress
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.4, the `/api/v1/*` route surface trusts the bearer token alone for authorisation on most endpoints. The codebase itself admits this at `internal/api/hosts.go:384`: "API trusts the bearer token for authorisation; per-CA ownership is enforced only in the Web layer." The Web UI gates state-changing routes through `loadAccessibleCA` (`internal/web/cas.go`); CA-management endpoints in `internal/api/cas.go` ALSO have proper `canAccessCA` gates. The gap is on the host, network, firewall, mobile-bundle, and most operator endpoints. Combined with the per-operator CA model from ADR 0002, this gives any non-admin operator API key broad cross-tenant access — instant privilege escalation in the worst case. Version 0.3.4 fixes the issue.
What this means
- Exposure
- Exploitable remotely over the network, with an ordinary user account and with no action from the victim.
- Impact
- An attacker can read sensitive data, modify or destroy data and take the service offline. The impact spreads beyond the vulnerable component into other parts of the system.
- Weakness
- No authorisation check happens before the action.
- Likelihood
- Its EPSS score stays low: nothing points to imminent exploitation, which is no reason to leave it unpatched.
What to doPatch without waiting for the next scheduled cycle.
Read automatically from the CVSS vector, the weakness type (CWE) and the EPSS score. The technical description above remains the one published by NIST.