CVE-2026-55954
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in ueberauth ueberauth_apple allows account takeover via unvalidated ID token claims. The Ueberauth.Strategy.Apple.Token.payload/2 function verifies the JWT signature of the callback id_token against Apple's JWKS but does not validate any registered claims. The iss, aud, exp, and iat claims are read from the token and passed on to Ueberauth.Strategy.Apple.handle_callback!/1, which derives the logged-in user's uid and email directly from the unvalidated sub claim. An attacker who obtains any Apple-signed ID token bearing the victim's sub (via a captured expired token, or via an ID token issued to a sibling client in the same Apple developer team) can replay it against the vulnerable callback and be authenticated as the victim. The absent exp check makes stolen tokens usable indefinitely, and the absent aud check enables cross-application account takeover across clients that share an Apple developer team. This issue affects ueberauth_apple: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.2.
What this means
- Exposure
- Exploitable remotely over the network, without authentication and with no action from the victim. It also depends on circumstances the attacker does not control.
- Impact
- An attacker can read sensitive data and modify or destroy data.
- Weakness
- Authentication relies on a spoofable value such as an IP address or header.
- Likelihood
- Its EPSS score stays low: nothing points to imminent exploitation, which is no reason to leave it unpatched.
What to doPatch without waiting for the next scheduled cycle. Start with the instances exposed to the internet.
Read automatically from the CVSS vector, the weakness type (CWE) and the EPSS score. The technical description above remains the one published by NIST.