CVE-2026-63914
NVD analysis in progress
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns xfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate() in net/key/af_key.c both hardcode &init_net for the multicast that announces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE. XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the rest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008. The other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using xs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb->sk); only the migrate path was missed. Two consequences of the init_net hardcoding: 1. The notification (selector, old/new endpoint addresses, and the km_address) is delivered to listeners on init_net's XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey BROADCAST_ALL groups rather than on the issuing netns. An IKE daemon running in init_net therefore receives migration notifications originating from any other netns on the host. 2. An IKE daemon running inside a non-init netns and subscribed to its own XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey groups never receives the notification of its own migration. IKEv2 MOBIKE / address-update handling inside a netns is silently broken. Thread struct net through km_migrate() and the xfrm_mgr.migrate function pointer, drop the &init_net override in xfrm_send_migrate() and pfkey_send_migrate(), and pass the caller's net (already in scope in xfrm_migrate() via sock_net(skb->sk)) all the way down. struct xfrm_mgr is in-tree only and not exported as a stable API, so the function-pointer signature change is internal. pfkey_broadcast() is already netns-aware via net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id) since the pernet conversion. The five other pfkey_broadcast() callers in af_key.c already pass xs_net(x), sock_net(sk) or a per-netns net, so this only removes the &init_net outlier.
What this means
- Exposure
- Exploitable with local access to the machine, with an ordinary user account and with no action from the victim.
- Impact
- An attacker can read sensitive data and degrade the service. The impact spreads beyond the vulnerable component into other parts of the system.
- Likelihood
- Its EPSS score stays low: nothing points to imminent exploitation, which is no reason to leave it unpatched.
What to doFold into the next patch cycle.
Read automatically from the CVSS vector, the weakness type (CWE) and the EPSS score. The technical description above remains the one published by NIST.