CVE-2026-72242
NVD analysis in progress
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect() selinux_sctp_bind_connect() dereferences sk->sk_socket to pass a struct socket * to selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper(). However, when the hook is invoked from the ASCONF softirq path (sctp_process_asconf), there is no file reference guaranteeing that sk->sk_socket is non-NULL. The setsockopt callers (bindx, connectx, set_primary, sendmsg connect) hold a file reference and are not affected. Both selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper() immediately resolve sock->sk, never using the struct socket * for anything else. Refactor the inner logic into helpers that take a struct sock * directly so that selinux_sctp_bind_connect() never needs to touch sk->sk_socket at all.
What this means
- Exposure
- Exploitable remotely over the network, without authentication and with no action from the victim.
- Impact
- An attacker can take the service offline.
- Likelihood
- Its EPSS score stays low: nothing points to imminent exploitation, which is no reason to leave it unpatched.
What to doFold into the next patch cycle. Start with the instances exposed to the internet.
Read automatically from the CVSS vector, the weakness type (CWE) and the EPSS score. The technical description above remains the one published by NIST.