CVE-2026-75596
NVD analysis in progress
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, the default io.netty.handler.ssl.SniHandler constructors use the pre-handshake ClientHello aggregation path in handler/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/ssl/SslClientHelloHandler.java at io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode, where handshakeBuffer.clear() and writeBytes() recopy all previously received body bytes for every additional TLS record. An unauthenticated remote peer can advertise a large ClientHello and deliver its body in thousands of tiny records, causing quadratic CPU work on the event loop before the TLS handshake completes and degrading TLS handling for other clients. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
What this means
- Exposure
- Exploitable remotely over the network, without authentication and with no action from the victim.
- Impact
- An attacker can take the service offline.
- Weakness
- A chosen input triggers an algorithm’s worst case and collapses performance.
- Likelihood
- Its EPSS score stays low: nothing points to imminent exploitation, which is no reason to leave it unpatched.
What to doFold into the next patch cycle. Start with the instances exposed to the internet.
Read automatically from the CVSS vector, the weakness type (CWE) and the EPSS score. The technical description above remains the one published by NIST.