Quad9 pulls its DNS resolver out of France rather than block domains for beIN
On November 24, 2026, the public resolver Quad9 will stop answering DNS queries from France, after an October 21 ruling ordered it to block piracy domains. If your network points at 9.9.9.9, switch before that date: your Internet will stop with no error message.
November 24, 2026. The date on which Quad9 will stop answering DNS queries coming from France. October 21, 2026. A French court rules in favor of beIN and orders the Swiss foundation to block resolution of domains accused of pirating sports broadcasts. €1,000 per day. The financial penalty, reduced by the court from €580,000, that applies as long as the blocking is not in place. Why it matters: hospitals, universities, EDF, the SNCF, and the DINUM use 9.9.9.9 without knowing it — and on November 24, their Internet will stop without explanation.
What the French court ordered
The dispute pits Quad9 against beIN, a Qatari broadcaster holding sports broadcast rights. beIN demands that Quad9 block, for users located in France, the DNS resolution of a set of domain names it accuses of pirating its content. On October 21, 2026, the court sided with beIN and attached a daily penalty to the injunction. The court reduced the fine from €580,000 to €1,000 per day — a maximum of €24,000 for this case — but the real stakes were never financial.
Quad9 says it plainly: “this has never been just a financial issue: it is a matter of principle.” The Swiss public-benefit foundation, founded in 2017 to protect the cybersecurity of Internet users, refuses to lie to its users about the DNS answers they receive. For it, recursive DNS resolution is a neutral and passive service: adding domains to a blocklist means altering the answer, not filtering content. Unlike an ISP or a hosting provider, it hosts nothing, serves nothing, and has no way to identify its users.
Why Quad9 cannot comply without betraying itself
Two options were theoretically open to Quad9 to comply. The first — global blocking — consists of adding the targeted domains to its global malicious-domain blocklist, the same one it uses to filter phishing and malware on 9.9.9.9. That would satisfy the injunction, but with an extraterritorial effect: a French court decision would then apply to every user on the planet, for the commercial benefit of a foreign company. “Such a system would set a precedent that any nation could impose its laws upon any other nation by blocking DNS names,” the foundation writes.
The second — geoIP blocking — has already failed, and not in theory. In the Sony case in Germany, between 2021 and 2023, Quad9 tried that workaround to keep serving the country during the proceedings. Sony Music then used a VPN to reach the blocked content from Germany, the court found the circumvention, and Quad9 was fined for contempt. The lesson is verified by experience: DNS geo-blocking is bypassed in under a minute, and the bypass backfires on the resolver itself.
Quad9’s conclusion is radical but logical: neither global blocking nor geoIP blocking is viable. That leaves the third option — leaving. “We will make our services unavailable to French users,” the foundation announces, with departure set for November 24, 2026.
Who loses connectivity on November 24
The most concrete part of the file is the list Quad9 publishes of the French networks using its resolver. Because the service asks for neither account nor identity, the foundation only knows the autonomous system numbers the traffic originates from — and the reading is vertiginous. It includes the DINUM, which runs the State’s interministerial network, France Travail, the CEA Paris-Saclay, the Institut Pasteur, the RENATER education-and-research network, EDF, the SNCF, the AP-HM (Marseille’s public hospitals), France Télévisions, Thales, and Stormshield. The foundation notes that it lists only part of them “at random” among hundreds of networks.
Those users will receive no warning. That is the paradox of the Quad9 model: to preserve privacy, it stores no data that could identify who uses it — so it cannot notify anyone. On November 24, a hospital or a town hall whose resolver points at 9.9.9.9 will simply see its Internet stop, with no error message and no explanation. Hard-wired devices — security systems, thermostats, industrial equipment configured once and left alone — will be the hardest to fix.
A precedent that does not stop at Quad9
Quad9 is not the first public resolver to leave a country under the pressure of blocking injunctions. Cisco had already pulled OpenDNS out of France, Portugal, and Belgium under similar circumstances. And the next step is already underway: a Belgian court ordered Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco to block sites through their public resolvers by early January 2027, under threat of substantial penalties. The three companies have appealed, and Cloudflare — which has never blocked a domain through 1.1.1.1 — wrote it explicitly in a post published on November 17, 2026: “we will keep resisting misguided efforts to require blocking by public DNS resolvers.”
The underlying technical problem is well documented. Blocking a domain at the resolver level does not remove content from the Internet: the server hosting the pirated file stays online, and any user bypasses the block by switching resolvers in under a minute — or by knowing the IP address directly. A study cited by Cloudflare shows that most European piracy is hosted in Europe; the effective action would be to have the content removed at the hosting provider, not to punish the directory. By pushing Quad9 out, the French decision does not reduce piracy: it pushes users toward ISP default resolvers, which monetize their browsing data, or toward less reliable anonymous resolvers.
The verdict
If you run a network, check today where your resolvers point: any machine configured on 9.9.9.9 or 149.112.112.112 must switch before November 24. The simplest replacement is 1.1.1.1 (Cloudflare) or 8.8.8.8 (Google), or a self-hosted resolver (Unbound) to depend on no third party — and for individuals, the change takes a minute in the router or phone DNS settings.
On the substance, do not count on a technical resolution. DNS blocking is ineffective against piracy and dangerous for infrastructure, but it will only recede if regulation changes: Quad9 explicitly calls on French citizens to reach out to their legislators and Arcom, recalling that “looking up names is not a criminal offense.” The November 24 departure is reversible — the foundation maintains its appeal and says it wants to return. The question is whether French law will leave it a door, or whether 1.1.1.1 is next on the list.