OpenSSH closes the sshole flaw that let a 256-character password open Alpine and musl accounts
On November 5, 2026, OpenSSH 10.6p2 fixes CVE-2026-123158, a flaw present since 2016 that let an oversized password open hashless accounts on Alpine Linux and other musl systems. Update, or set PasswordAuthentication to no — the flaw was already exploited less than nine hours after disclosure.
November 5, 2026. OpenSSH 10.6p2 fixes CVE-2026-123158, a flaw nicknamed “sshole” by its discoverer, researcher Özgün Kültekin. 2016. The root cause traces back to a username-enumeration fix, CVE-2016-6210, which diverted password verification. November 6, 2026. Previdian observes real-world exploitation less than nine hours after disclosure. Why it matters: accounts designed to never accept a password open to any password longer than 256 characters — and at least one attacker has already walked in.
One character with two meanings
The flaw lives in a single character: the asterisk. On Linux, an account whose password field contains * in /etc/shadow cannot be opened by password — it is the standard way to disable password authentication for a user, a key-only deploy account, or an LDAP user. * is not a valid hash, so no password should ever match.
Except the asterisk has a second meaning. Since 2012, the crypt() function of the musl C library — the one behind Alpine Linux, OpenWrt, Buildroot and Yocto — refuses SHA-256 and SHA-512 passwords longer than 256 bytes, and returns * on failure. The result: an attacker who submits an oversized password makes crypt() return *, and OpenSSH compares that * against the * stored for the passwordless account. The two match. The login succeeds.
Kültekin puts it bluntly on sshhole.com: accounts that should never take a password “accept any password longer than 256 characters. Yes, any password.”
How the flaw was born in 2016
The responsibility is split between two old choices. The first belongs to OpenSSH. In 2016, to fix CVE-2016-6210 — a username-enumeration flaw that let attackers infer which accounts existed from response times — OpenSSH changed sshd to hash the password anyway even when an account has no usable hash, borrowing another account’s salt. The idea was to make response time identical for every account.
The second belongs to musl. Its crypt() returns * whenever a password exceeds 256 bytes, instead of hashing it. Combined, the two decisions create the short-circuit: OpenSSH hashes an invalid password, musl answers *, and the stored * is compared against the returned *. The account opens.
It took serendipity to find it. Kültekin says he built sshd in every combination he could think of and threw roughly 17,600 unusual login attempts at the builds — not alone, but with the help of swarms of AI agents. Only the musl-without-PAM build let in logins that should have been refused.
Who is actually at risk
Exploitation requires five precise conditions, all met by default on Alpine Linux:
- OpenSSH runs on a musl system (Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto);
- PAM authentication is disabled, as it is by default in Alpine’s
openssh-serverpackage; - SSH password authentication is enabled — OpenSSH’s default;
- at least one account carries a
*in place of a password hash; - another local account has a valid password hash.
glibc systems (Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora), setups that go through PAM, Dropbear and OpenBSD are not vulnerable.
The risk is amplified by Alpine’s official AWS and Azure cloud images: they ship a default alpine account with passwordless doas privileges — a direct path to root. SOCRadar lists the affected tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3. The root account has carried a * since roughly Alpine 3.16, but the default PermitRootLogin keeps it out of reach unless an administrator changed it. “Indirect root access is the larger concern,” SOCRadar warns.
Already exploited, in under nine hours
On November 6, 2026, Previdian revealed that its sensors had picked up attacks against the flaw, and that at least one got all the way in. “Our first observed attempt arrived less than nine hours after CVE publication, and we’ve confirmed successful root access on a honeypot running real Alpine Linux and OpenSSH,” explains founder Ryan Dewhurst.
The source address, 89.116.89.18, a Japan-based IP, used oversized passwords to bypass authentication and ran reconnaissance commands — id, uname, hostname — through non-interactive SSH sessions. Eight attempts have been counted so far, all from that single address. Previdian added the flaw to its own known-exploited list; CISA has not yet placed it on the KEV.
The speed is striking but explainable: “this vulnerability was particularly trivial to exploit, which significantly shrunk that timeline,” Dewhurst notes. Proof-of-concept exploits are already circulating on GitHub, which Previdian urges people not to run unverified — they may contain malware.
What to do now
The fix is in OpenSSH 10.6p2, and Alpine pushed patched packages for every branch the same day, from 3.16 to edge. One subtlety matters: installing the update does not replace the running sshd. The old binary keeps accepting connections until the service is restarted.
# Apply the fix, then restart the SSH daemon on Alpine
apk upgrade openssh
rc-service sshd restart For systems that cannot be updated immediately, the workaround is a single configuration line, followed by an sshd restart:
PasswordAuthentication no OpenSSH developer Damien Miller was blunt on Mastodon: “stop reading and set PasswordAuthentication=no or disable SSH for these systems IMMEDIATELY.”
To spot a break-in, search the logs for password logins on accounts that should not accept them:
grep "Accepted password" /var/log/messages
grep '^alpine:' /etc/shadow If an Accepted password entry appears for an account whose field contains *, the machine must be treated as compromised.
Verdict
CVE-2026-123158 is not one more item in the pile of SSH vulnerabilities. It is a design flaw at the intersection of two pieces of software — a 2016 anti-enumeration fix and a 2012 crypt() choice — that went unnoticed for ten years, until a researcher equipped with AI agents surfaced it and an attacker exploited it within hours.
If you run Alpine images, OpenWrt, or any musl distribution without PAM, update OpenSSH to 10.6p2 and restart sshd without delay — the real exploitation window is already open. If you cannot update within the hour, disable password authentication (PasswordAuthentication no) and check your logs for anomalous logins. The lesson applies to everyone: a * in /etc/shadow was never a guarantee — it was a tacit contract between OpenSSH and the libc, and that contract has just been broken.
References
- BleepingComputer — OpenSSH flaw lets attackers log into password-disabled Linux accounts (November 5, 2026)
- Help Net Security — OpenSSH flaw exploited in the wild just hours after disclosure (CVE-2026-123158) (November 6, 2026)
- sshhole.com — the sshole writeup by Özgün Kültekin
- Alpine Linux — OpenSSH password authentication bypass advisory (November 5, 2026)
- SOCRadar — sshole: OpenSSH password bypass on Alpine
- Previdian — CVE-2026-123158 summary