Starting August 28, 2026, a BGP hijack diverted Softaculous traffic to an attacker-controlled server for 33 hours, which served a malicious Virtualizor update to several hypervisors. Check for the java-jre-update.service unit, demand cryptographically signed update packages, and turn on RPKI filtering with your upstream.
Between August 28 and 30, 2026, attackers hijacked Softaculous’s 162.55.80.0/24 range to deliver a trojaned Virtualizor update to live hypervisors. Every Virtualizor operator should check for the java-jre-update.service, rotate credentials, and demand signed updates.
On August 18, 2026, Cloudflare published its measurement of RFC 9234 adoption, the BGP Role and OTC mechanism that catches route leaks at the source. The finding is blunt: support varies widely by vendor, and the OTC attribute only stops a leak if the whole path preserves it.
A survey published in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials maps BGP attacks into four families and eight subcategories. RPKI and ASPA only cover two of them; the other four rest on unverifiable local filters, as the May 20, 2025 Prefix-SID incident demonstrated.
RPKI validates the origin of a BGP announcement, never its path. PeerCortex measurements from August 2026 show 99% of route leaks detected over 90 days traveled paths with no ASPA coverage, deployed on just 3% of ASNs. Publishing your ASPA records takes thirty minutes.
On August 12, 2026, a malformed default route propagated by a route reflector at hosting provider TeraSwitch knocked 28.83% of staked SOL offline, within 4.51 points of Solana’s finality halt threshold. The lesson goes beyond blockchains: measure your ASN concentration and actually test your failover.
On July 31, 2026, a European cloud operator's prefix was hijacked for four hours via a fraudulent BGP announcement originating in Southeast Asia. RPKI and ROV would have stopped the incident in 87 seconds — yet nearly half of all IPv4 prefixes globally still lack protection.
